Tracy-Collins Trust Co. and Vilate P. Devine v. Marguerite Gessford Pierpont and Ella P. Meyer : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. and Vilate P. Devine v.
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont and Ella P. Meyer :
Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Senior & Senior; Francis M. Gibbons; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Devine v. Pierpont, No. 9022 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3300
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: FILED 
THE ESTATE OF THOMAS 
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, 
Deceased 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY and 
VILATE P. DEVINE, 
Appellan.ts, 
-vs.-
MARGUERITE GESSFORD 
PIERPONT and 
ELLA P. MEYER 
Respondents. 
M,n,y 7 -1959 
Case 
No. 9022 
APPELLANT'S.' BRIEF 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
FRANCIS M. GIBBONS 
622 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ST,ATEMENT OF THE CASE. .... , ............... , ..... _................................. 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................... 5 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ......... :...................................................... 10 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 11 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................... 11 
POINT I. THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT 
PAYMENTS U N D E R SUBPARAGRAPH 
SEVENTH (i) SHOULD COMMENCE FROM 
THE DATE OF THE FINAL DISTRIBU-
TION OF THE ESTATE TO THE TRUSTEE.... 13 
POINT II. THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT 
THE TESTATOR INTENDED TO POST-
PONE THE PAYMENTS PROVIDED FOR 
IN SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) UNTIL 
THE ESTATE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO 
THE TRUSTEE .......................................................... 18 
POINT III. THE PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH 
SEVENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE NOT AN-
NUITIES AND ARE NOT CONTROLLED 
BY SECTION 74-3-14, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953 ................................................................ 25 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
INTEREST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS 
ON THE AMOUNTS DECREED TO BE DUE 
THEM ·················--···········------·--··-·······················---·····--· 38 
CONCLUSION ··-···-····-·--------·····--·--·······················-··········---·····----------····· 38 
ENCLOSURE "A" ··········-·------·-------·-·---·····---········--·-·····-·········------·····--·- 40 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
In re Pittock's Will 
102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633 ........... ---·-------·--·--·····-·--·--·--················· 33 
Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co. 
5 Utah 494, 17 Pac. 631................................................................ 16 
Woodley v. Woodley 
47 C. A. 2d 188, 117 P. 2d 722 ... ---·-----··--··-··-----·-·-·--···---·--·-··--·--- 29 
Wright v. Union Pacific R. Co. 
22 Utah 338, 62 Pac. 317 ........... ----·--·······----····-------------·-········-··· 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E 0 F C 0 NT EN T S- (Continued) 
Statutes Page 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 31-11-2 ................................ 26,28 
Section 74-2-1 .................................. 13 
Section 7 4-2-2 .................................. 13 
Section 74-2-5 .................................. 13 
Section 7 4-3-1 ........ .......................... 27 
Section 74-3-14 .. 3, 4, 10, 18, 25_, 26, 35, 36 
Section 74-3-16 ................................ 36 
Texts 
95 Corpus Juris Secundum §602 (p. 803)............................................ 31 
96 Corpus Juris Secundum §902 (p. 351) .... ---··---·--···············--············ 27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
THE ESTATE OF THOMAS 
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, 
Deceased 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY and 
VILATE P. DEVINE, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
MARGUERITE GESSFORD 
PIERPONT and 
ELLA P. MEYER 
Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9022 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Thomas Fairclough Pierpont, hereafter called testa-
tor, died testate on September 14, 1954, in Provo, Utah. 
The testator's will was, on October 22, 1954, admitted 
to probate in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and 
for the County of Utah and Tracy-Collins Trust Com-
pany was duly appointed as executor (R. pp. 29, 467). 
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On October 2, 1957, the executor filed its second and 
final account and report, petition for confirmation of 
agreement, petition for construction of will and petition 
for final distribution. The hearing on this petition was 
held on October 18, 1957, and timely legal notice thereof 
was given to all interested parties. The petition was 
granted insofar as it requested final distribution of the 
estate and by an order effective as of October 18 1957 
' ' the residue of the estate was distributed to Tracy-Collins 
Trust Company as trustee (hereinafter called trustee) 
for the use and benefit of certain persons named in the 
will (R. p. 467). 
As the result of a demand made by the attorney for 
Mrs. Ella P. Meyer that the monthly payments be made 
for the period commencing with the testator's death, said 
petition also requested the probate court to interpret the 
meaning of subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the Will* 
and to make an order directing the trustee as to the date 
from which payments to ]\frs. Pierpont and Mrs. Meyer 
should be made. On October 25, 1957, the probate court, 
after a hearing in which 1frs. Meyer's counsel partici-
pated, ruled in a minute entry that the bequests in sub-
paragraph SEVENTH (i) "are in the nature of annui-
"' "(i) From the income of the Trust Es~ate and, if ins~~icient, 
from the principal thereof, my Trustee, subJect to the provisions .of 
subparagraph (k) of this Paragraph SEVENTH, shall make dis-
bursements as follows: 
(1) To my wife MARGUERITE GESSFORD PIERPONT, subject to 
the provisions of Paragraph EIGHTH of this Wil~, the sum. of 'fwo 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month durmg her lifetime, 
PROVIDED EXPRESSLY that if she shall remarry such pay-
ments shall cease upon her remarriage; and 
(2) Tc1 my sister ELLA P. MEYER the sum of One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00) per month during her lifetime." 
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ties" and as such commenced at testator's death. The 
minute entry also ruled that the matter was controlled by 
Section 74-3-14, U. C. A.1953 and that the bequest to Mrs. 
Pierpont was in addition to the family allowance provided 
for her by paragraph SIXTH* (R. p. 468). Thereafter, 
the trustee filed a petition and an amended petition for 
rehearing the petition for construction of will and for re-
consideration and cancellation of the minute entry to 
which respondents filed answers and amended answers 
(R. p. 468). The court granted the trustee's petition for 
rehearing, as amended, and such rehearing was had on 
June 30, 1958. Timely notice of this hearing was given 
to all heirs-at-law, legatees and devisees of the testator 
and all of the beneficiaries under the trust (R. p. 469). 
All the trust beneficiaries except John B. Pierpont 
appeared either personally or through a duly appointed 
guardian ad litem and all of said beneficiaries except 
respondents joined in the trustee's petition for rehearing 
as amended (R. p. 469). John B. Pierpont had not been 
found at the time of the hearing but a citation and sum-
mons had been duly served upon him by publication in 
the Daily Herald, a newspaper published in Provo, Utah 
(R. p. 373). John B. Pierpont later joined in the trustee's 
petition for rehearing as amended (R. p. 390). 
After argument at the rehearing the court took the 
matter under advisement and in a second minute entry 
* "SIXTH: It is my desire that my Executor shall cause provision 
to be made for the payment to my wife, MARGUERITE GESSFORD 
PIERPONT, of a family allowance of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY 
DOLLARS ($250.00) per month from the date of my death until 
such time as my residual estate shall be distributed to my Trustee, as 
provided in Paragraph SEVENTH hereof." 
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dated September 24, 1958, adhered to its prior ruling 
(R. p. 463). 
Thereafter the court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which included findings that the pro-
visions made by said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the 
testator's will were in the nature of annuities and con-
trolled by Section 74-3-14, U.C.A. 1953; that the monthly 
payments should commence September 14, 1954, the date 
of death of the testator; that the will became effective as 
of the date of death of the testator and the trust pro-
Yisions became effective as of that date; and that there 
was nothing in the will to indicate the testator intended 
to postpone the payments provided for in subparagraph 
SEVENTH (i) of the will until the estate was distributed 
to the trustee (R. pp. 460-466). 
The court concluded and decreed that respondent 
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont was entitled to the sum of 
$9,282.88 representing monthly payments from Septem-
ber 14, 1954, to October 18, 1957, the date on which the 
residue of the estate vvas distributed to the trustee to-
gether with interest on said $250.00 payments found to 
be due her ''from the dates that they became due at the 
rate of six per cent per annum.'' This amount was 
decreed to be in, addition to the sum of $8,750.00 repre-
senting the family allowance paid to the widow during 
probate and as to ·which there is no question. The court 
further concluded and decreed that Ella P. ~:!eyer was 
Pntitled to the sum of $3,713.16 representing monthly 
pnyments found to be due her under said will provision 
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from September 14, 1954, to October 18, 1957, "together 
with interest on said $100.00 payments * * * from the 
dates that they became due at the rate of six per cent per 
annum.'' 
The trustee and Vila te P. De Vine, one of the bene-
ficiaries under the trust, duly appealed from said decree 
(R. p. 473). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(a) Circumstarnces under which the will was executed : 
Respondent Marguerite Gessford Pierpont is the 
widow of the testator. Mrs. Pierpont was many years 
younger than the testator and married him when he was 
at an advanced age (R. p. 370). Prior to the marriage 
the widow was employed by the testator as his private 
secretary (R. p. 370). The widow and the testator were 
married on January 17, 1951, so that at the date of testa-
tor's death on September 14, 1954, they had been mar-
ried less than four years. Respondent Ella P. Meyer is 
the sister of the testa tor ( R. p. 14). 
The testator left the five following surviving children 
born of another marriage: Naomi P. Petit, Vilate P. 
DeVine, Thomas G. Pierpont, Ruth P. Eccles and John B. 
Pierpont who are residual beneficiaries under the testa-
mentary trust (R. p. 16). Two of the decedent's children 
born of said other marriage, Clifford S. Pierpont and 
~e Margaret Pierpont Gardner, predeceased the testator and 
~ the children of said Clifford S. Pierpont: Clifford S. Pier-
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pont, Jr., Smoot S. Pierpont and George S. Pierpont; 
and the children of said Margaret Pierpont Gardner: 
Reed P. Gardner, David P. Gardner and Vilate Gardner 
constitute the remaining residual beneficiaries under the 
testamentary trust (R. p. 16). 
In addition to the above-named grandchildren, the 
testator left surviving him the following named ten 
grandchildren: Thomas P. Petit, Richard P. Petit, Diana 
D. Felt, Thomas C. Pierpont, Kay Pierpont, Susan 
Eccles, Barbara E. Co it, Dennis B. Pierpont, John B. 
Pierpont, Jr., and Cherie Pierpont. (R. p. 71-72) All the 
testator's grandchildren are beneficiaries under subpara-
graph SEVENTH (j) (1). The above-named living chil-
dren of the testator, in addition to being residual bene-
ficiaries under the trust are also direct beneficiaries under 
subparagraph SEVENTH (i) (2). 
(b) Nature of testator's estate: 
The inventory and appraisement shows that the 
value of testator's gross estate at death was $325,443.91 
(R. pp. 128-134). This included: 
(i) Stock in corporations valued at ________ $304,034.06 
(ii) Vivian Park home valued at____________ 7,200.00 
(iii) Automobile valued at ------------------------ 1,900.00 
(iv) Accounts receivable valued at__________ 11,550.99 
(Later in the first account (R. p. 
300) an additional account receiv-
able for $3,524.00 was added 
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making total accounts receivable 
of $15,074.99.) 
( v) Furniture valued at ---------------------·----
(vi) Cash of only------------------------------------------
750.00 
8.86 
$325,443.91 
In addition to the above property the state inheri-
tance tax report (R. p. 172) included the following jointly 
owned property which vested in the widow at testator's 
death: 
(i) Cash in joint checking account_ ___________ $ 240.23 
(ii) Vivian Park real property__________________ 200.00 
(iii) Provo Shakespeare A venue home._____ 12,000.00 
$12,440.23 
An analysis of the first and second accounts filed 
in connection with the administration of the testator's 
estate appearing respectively at pages 208-213 and 297-
305 of the record shows that none of the property in the 
estate produced any income during probate except that 
interest of $244.75 was realized under the contract of sale 
of the Vivian Park home reported in the second account 
(R. p. 297). The other cash receipts reported in the two 
accounts consisted of loans to the estate (totaling approx-
imately $70,000.00; insurance payments and premium re-
funds; money received in the settlement of a law suit 
and money received in the conversion of estate assets. 
In this connection it should be noted that not until the 
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receipt of the cash distribution from the Provo Foundry 
and Machine Company on August 29, 1957, did the estate 
have any liquid principal assets not needed to pay the 
estate debts, taxes and expenses of administration (R. 
p. 297). 
The net residual estate distributed to the trustee, 
after payment of expenses of administration, taxes and 
specific bequests was $158,339.22. (R. p. 336) 
(c) General con.ten.ts of will an.d manner estate dis-
posed of: 
After providing for the payment of debts, taxes and 
expenses of administration in paragraph FIRST, the 
testator disposed of his estate in the following manner: 
Under paragraph SECOND the widow was given the 
automobile and the furniture and equipment in both the 
Provo City and Provo Canyon homes (R. p. 11). 
Paragraph THIRD made seventeen specific be-
quests totaling $19,000.00 (R. pp. 11-12). 
Paragraph FOURTH bequeathed a total of $5,000.00 
to Tracy-Collins Trust Company in trust for the use and 
benefit of John B. Pierpont and Thomas G. Pierpont 
(R. p. 12). 
Paragraph FIFTH provided that estate assets were 
not to be sold unless the executor considered it could be 
done at a fair and reasonable price, ''even though such 
course may inYolve delay in the distribution to be made 
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under this Will and in the settling of my estate.'' (R. p. 
13) Subparagraph SEVENTH (k) similarly provides 
that after distribution to it the trustee was not to sell 
principal assets at a sacrifice in order to obtain funds to 
make payments under the trust (R. p. 15). These provis-
ions have important significance, hereafter commented 
on, owing to the want of liquid assets and the composition 
of the estate which consisted chiefly of stock in the Provo 
Foundry and Machine Company, a company which was 
organized, developed, controlled and managed by testator. 
Paragraph SIXTH provided for the payment to the 
widow of a family allowance of $250.00 per month ''from 
the date of my death until such time as my residual estate 
shall be distributed to my Trustee, as provided in Para-
graph SEVENTH hereof." (R. p. 13) Under this pro-
vision the widow received a total of $8,750.00 during pro-
bate as a family allowance (R. pp 212 and 300). 
The residual estate was then bequeathed and de-
vised in trust to appellant bank to be held and disposed 
of in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
SEVENTH (R. pp. 13-16). 
Paragraph EIGHTH provided an alternative 
$20,000.00 bequest to the widow in lieu of all other be-
quests and devises given to her. (R. p. 17) The widow 
declined to accept this alternative bequest. 
Paragraphs NINTH through THIRTEENTH con-
tain general provisions (R. p. 17), some of which here-
after will be discussed in more detail. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAY-
MENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) 
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE 
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE TO THE 
TRUSTEE. 
PoiNT II. 
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT THE 
TESTATOR INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE PAY-
MENTS PROVIDED FOR IN SUBPARAGRAPH SEV-
ENTH (i) UNTIL THE EST ATE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO 
THE TRUSTEE. 
PoiNT III. 
THE PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH 
SEVENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE NOT ANNUITIES 
AND ARE NOT CONTROLLED BY SECTION 74-3-14, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT INTER-
EST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE AMOUNTS 
DECREED TO BE DUE THEM. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Preliminary to arguing the above points, appellants 
emphasize four basic principles which, appellants submit, 
govern this appeal: 
First, the interpretation of trust provisions of a will 
is inherently an equitable function of the court. No evi-
dence was introduced at the hearings below and no ques-
tions of fact were tried or determined. The purported 
''findings of fact'' made by the lower court were actually 
conclusions since they were founded only on the lower 
court's interpretation of the testator's will made with-
out supporting evidence. These facts alter the usual 
appellate rule that a lower court's decree will be sustained 
if there is a reasonable basis for it, and impose on this 
court the duty to interpret the will de novo according to 
applicable law. 
In Wright v. Union Pacific R. Co., 22 Utah 338, 62 
Pac. 317, 318 (Utah 1900) this court in commenting upon 
the scope of review in cases where no evidence is intro-
duced in the trial court stated in part: 
''The trial court found that the verdict was not 
a chance verdict, and it is claimed by respondent's 
counsel that, as the affidavits are conflicting, this 
finding is conclusive, and quotes, in support of this 
contention, the cases of Nelson v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 15 Utah, 328, 49 Pac. 644, and Mangum v. 
Mining Co., 15 Utah, 551, 50 Pac. 834. These cases 
have no application whatever to motions for a new 
trial, and are applicable only to trials by jury, or 
11 
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by the court when a jury is not demanded. This 
court has frequently held that, even on appeals in 
equity cases, notwithstanding both questions of 
law and fact are subject to review, the findings of 
the trial court will not be set aside when the evi-
dence is conflicting, unless the evidence is clearly 
insufficient. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. 
South Ogden Land, Building & Improvement Co. 
(Utah) 58 Pac. 846; Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah, 
45, 57 Pac. 712; McCornick v. Mangum, 20 Utah, 
17, 57 Pac. 428; Irrigation Co. v. Thomas, 19 Utah, 
360, 57 Pac. 30; and numerous other cases cited in 
foregoing decisions. All of these cases relate to 
findings in trials on the merits, and the reason on 
which they are based has no application whatever 
to motions for new trials. In a trial on the merits 
the witnesses are subject to cross-examination, 
and, being in view of the trial judge or referee, he 
has a better opportunity to judge of their credi-
bility than the appellate court. On a motion for 
a new trial supported and resisted, as in the case 
at bar, on ex parte affidavits, those making the 
affidavits are not subject to cross-examination, 
and, not being before the trial judge, his opportu-
nity to judge of their credibility and the weight of 
their statements is no better than the appellate 
court. In, all such cases, and in equity cases where 
the evidence consists exclusively of depositions, 
the rea.son upon, which the decisions quoted are 
ba.sed fa.ils, a!tbd the ruJe established by them has 
no application to su,ch cases. White v. Pease, 15 
Utah, 170, 49 Pac. 416; State v. Halford, 18 Utah, 
3, 54 Pac. 819; Saunders Y. Pacific Co., 15 Utah, 
334, 49 Pac. 646." (Emphasis added) 
Second, the meaning of the ·will is to be ascertained 
''according to the intention of the testator'' ( § 7 4-2-1, 
U. C. A. 1953). 
12 
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Third, such intention is to be determined ''from the 
words of the will, taking into view the circumstances 
under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declara-
tions"(§ 74-2-2, U. C. A.1953). 
Fourth, meaning is to be ascertained not only from 
the will provisions in question but from all the will pro-
visions ''construed in relation to each other, and, if pos-
sible, so as to form one consistent whole'' ( § 7 4-2-5, 
U. C. A. 1953). 
PorNT I. 
THE WILL SHOWS AN INTENTION THAT PAY-
MENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH SEVENTH (i) 
SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE DATE OF THE _ 
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF THB ESTATE TO THE 
TRUSTEE. 
The judgment appealed from is founded in large 
part upon finding No. 7 (which is actually a conclusion) 
that the trust provisions of the will became effective on 
the date of testator's death. (R p. 464-465) The implica-
tion is that if the trust provisions became effective on 
that date the payments under subparagraph SEV-
ENTH ( i) commenced then. 
The question of the time when the trust provisions 
became effective must be answered from an interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the will. 
13 
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There is no provision of the will that states or sug-
gests that the trust provisions became effective at the 
testator's death. On the other hand, there are a number 
of will provisions which show a clear intention that the 
trust provisions were to become operative only when the 
residual estate was distributed to the trustee. 
Note how explicitly the testator delineated between 
the periods of probate and trust administration. Para-
graph TvVELFTH appointed Tracy-Collins Trust Com-
pany as executor of testator's will. Paragraph SEV-
ENTH designated the bank as trustee of the testamen-
tary trust. Paragraph FIFTH contains instructions to 
the executor about not selling assets at a sacrifice during 
probate and prior to distribution while subparagraph 
SEVENTH (k) contains similar instructions to the 
trustee relative to the trust estate. In paragraph THIR-
TEENTH the testator expresses the -wish that the 
executor and the trustee would consult "ith his son and 
sons-in-law about matters relating to the administra-
tion and handling "of my estate or of said trust." These 
provisions show an unmistakable intention that there 
would be successive not simultaneous periods of adminis-
tration by the executor and the trustee. 
Note also the significant language of paragraph 
SIXTH where the testator defines the period during 
which the widow would receive the family allowance as 
being "from the date of my death until such time as my 
residual estate shall be distributed to my Trustee, as pro-
v,ided in Paragraph SEVENTH hereof.''' (R. p.13) (Em-
14 
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phasis added) Paragraph SEVENTH, which immediately 
follows, provides in part: 
"I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, resi-
due and remainder of my estate, real, personal or 
mixed, wheresoever situate, whereof I may be 
seized or possessed, or to which I may in any man-
ner be entitled, or in which I may be interested 
at the time of my death, to TRACY-COLLINS 
TRUST COMPANY, of Salt Lake City, Utah, as 
Trustee, in trust, nevertheless, for the following 
uses and purposes: * * * (R. p. 13) 
These two paragraphs read together distinctly show 
the testator intended that the distribution of the residual 
estate to the trustee referred to in paragraph SIXTH 
and the bequest and devise provided for in paragraph 
SEVENTH were to occur simultaneously after pro bate 
had been completed and the residual estate determined. 
In other words, the distribution referred to in paragraph 
SIXTH is synonymous with the devise and bequest in 
paragraph SEVENTH. This interpretation is corrobo-
rated by the important difference in the language of 
disposition used in paragraph SEVENTH and in para-
graphs SECOND, THIRD and FOURTH. 
Paragraph SECOND provides "I hereby give, grant, 
devise and bequeath to my wife, MARGUERITE GESS-
FORD PIERPONT'' certain described personal prop-
erty. (R. p. 11) In paragraph THIRD the testator made 
seventeen specific bequests using the words "I hereby 
give and bequeath.'' (R. p. 11) In subparagraph 
FOURTH (a) the testator granted $2,500.00 to Tracy-
Collins Trust Company in trust for his son John B. Pier-
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pont using the words ''I hereby give and bequeath'' and 
under subparagraph FOURTH (b) in creating a similar 
trust for his son Thomas G. Pierpont the testator also 
used the same words "I hereby give and bequeath." 
(R. p. 12) 
However, 1n paragraph SEVENTH the testator 
omitted use of the word "hereby" where he provided "I 
give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and re-
mainder of my estate * * * to TRACY-COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY * * *." (R. p. 13) 
The use of the word "hereby" can and does have 
significant meaning. For example, the language in an act 
"that there be, and hereby is, granted" was construed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co., 
5 Utah 494, 17 Pac. 631, 633, to mean the grant of legal 
title in prcesenti whether the lands included in the grant 
were surveyed and selected or not. 
Of greater significance in connection with the Pier-
pont will is the consistent use of the word "hereby" in 
each of the paragraphs making specific bequests 
and the omission of the word ''hereby'' in the grant of the 
residuary estate to Tracy-Collins Trust Company, as 
trustee. 
Finally, the provisiOns of paragraph SEVENTH 
which prescribe and define the power and duties of the 
trustee demonstrate the fallacy of the lower court's "find-
ing'' that the trust provisions of the will became effective 
at testator's death. 
16 
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Subparagraph SEVENTH (a) empowers the trustee 
to manage, contract with respect to, convey, deal with, 
exchange, lease or sell the trust property ''as the Trustee 
would have the right to do if it were the individual owner 
thereof." Subparagraph SEVENTH (b) empowers it to 
vote corporate stock belonging to the trust estate. Sub-
paragraph SEVENTH (d) authorizes it to set up 
reserves out of income for taxes and assessments and for 
repair of buildings. Subparagraph SEVENTH (g) em-
powers it to invest and reinvest the trust estate as it 
seems "meet and proper." (R. pp. 13-14) Obviously these 
powers could not have been exercised by the trustee be-
fore distribution of the residual estate to it as the prop-
erty of testator's estate was in the exclusive possession 
and control of the executor until that time. Yet the lower 
court found that the trust provisions became effective at 
the testator's death. It is unreasonable to say as the lower 
court does that the testator intended to confer powers and 
duties upon the trustee effective at a time when it was 
impossible for the trustee to exercise or discharge them. 
The only interpretation that gives meaning and co-
herency to all the various will provisions mentioned and 
analyzed above is that the trust property vested in and 
came into the possession of the trustee at the time of the 
distribution of the residual estate by the executor and the 
trust estate came in to existence and the trust provisions 
with respect thereto became effective at that time. 
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PorNT II. 
THE WILL SHOWS AN. INTENTION THAT THE 
TESTATOR INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE PAY-
MENTS PROVIDED FOR IN SUBPARAGRAPH SEV-
ENTH (i) UNTIL THE ESTATE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO 
THE TRUSTEE. 
The lower court's ruling that the subparagraph 
SEVENTH (i) monthly trust payments commenced at 
death is based upon the erroneous conclusion that said 
payments are annuities controlled by Section 74-3-14, 
U. C. A. 1953, which provides: 
"74-3-14. Lega.cies a;n,d Annuities - When 
due. - Legacies are due and deliverable at the 
expiration of one year after the testator's decease. 
Annuities commence at the testator's decease." 
Point III below explains the reasons why said pay-
ments are not annuities. 
The basic question is: "When did the testator in-
tend that the SEVENTH ( i) monthly payments would 
commence~'' The answer to this question must be founded 
on an interpretation of the will. 
Said payments are directed to be paid "from the 
income of the Trust Estate and, if sufficient, from the 
principal thereof." (R. p. 14) The trust estate did not 
come into existence until the testator's residual estate was 
distributed to the trustee on October 18, 1957. In fact, until 
probate was completed and all debts, taxes, expenses and 
specific bequests paid, there \Yas no certaint3T that a trust 
est:lto would eYen exist. It is cYident that prior to its 
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creation the trust estate could not have produced income 
nor could its principal have been invaded. The trustee, 
not the executor, was invested with the duties, powers and 
discretions of the trust. The manifest implication from 
this is that the payments to respondents under subpara-
graph SEVENTH (i) were intended to commence on 
October 18, 1957, when distribution of the residual estate 
occurred, particularly since there is nothing in the will 
showing an intention that such payments were to com-
mence at an earlier date. 
This interpretation finds support in the provisions 
of paragraphs SIXTH and SEVENTH pertaining to 
monthly payments to the widow. 
Paragraph SIXTH authorizes the payment to the 
widow of a $250.00 per month family allowance extend-
ing from the date of death until the residual estate" shall 
be distributed to my Trustee as provided in Paragraph 
SEVENTH hereof.'' (R. p. 13) Paragraph SEVENTH 
under which the trust estate vested in the trustee at the 
time of the distribution of the residual estate provides for 
the payment to the widow of a similar monthly sum, sub-
ject to certain expressed conditions, payable from the 
income of the trust estate and if insufficient, from the 
principal thereof. 
It is significant that the monthly payments to be 
made from the trust were identical in amount to the au-
thorized family allowance payments. Since the family 
allowance payments were to continue until the residual 
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estate was distributed to the trustee and the trust pay-
ments commenced then, the testator thus provided for the 
uninterrupted payment of stated amounts to the widow 
from the time of his death to the time of the widow's 
death subject only to the limitations of paragraph 
EIGHTH and subparagraphs SEVENTH (i) and (k). 
These provisions read together disclose a carefully de-
vised plan considered adequate by the testator to provide 
for the widow's needs. The testator's decision as to the 
amounts of these payments doubtless was influenced by 
his intimate knowledge of the widow's habits of living 
and ability to work, by the size of his estate and the needs 
of the other beneficiaries. 
Pursuant to these provisions the widow received 
$250.00 per month during probate as a family allowance 
and since creation of the trust on October 18, 1957, she 
has received and is now receiving $250.00 per month 
under subparagraph SEVENTH (i) and will continue to 
receive same unless and until one of the conditions speci-
fied in subparagraphs SEVENTH (i) or (k) occurs. Mrs. 
Meyer has received since October 18, 1957, and is now 
receiving the sum of $100.00 per month paid in accord-
ance with subparagraph SEVENTH (i). 
Neither the appellants nor the other beneficiaries 
under the trust question the right of respondents to 
retain the payments already made to them or to their 
continued right to receive the monthly payments in 
accordmwe with said subparagraphs SEVENTH (i) and 
(k). Appellants do, howeYer, question the right of re-
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spondents to receive the amounts of $9,282.88 (as to Mrs. 
Pierpont) and $3,713.16 (as to Mrs. Meyer) decreed by 
the lower court to be due them which amounts are addi-
tional to those already received. 
As to the widow, the effect of said decree is to give 
her a total of $500.00 per month for the period between 
the testator's death and the distribution of the residual 
estate to the trustee. This is manifestly contrary to the 
clear intention of the testator that the payments from 
the trust commence as of the date of the distribution of 
the residual estate and that the widow receive $250.00 per 
month. Furthermore, it creates an unreasonable result 
which is unfair and unjust to the other beneficiaries. 
The chief asset of the estate was 390 shares of the 
capital stock of Provo Foundry and Machine Company, 
75 shares of which were transferred to Brigham Young 
University during probate in settlement of a dispute (R. 
p. 300). The estate had only $8.86 in cash and the prop-
erty of the state produced a total of only $244.75 in 
income during probate of the estate [see first and second 
accounts (R. pp. 208-213; 297-305)]. This required the 
executor to borrow a total of about $70,000.00 during pro-
bate to pay taxes, debts, probate expenses and the family 
allowance (R. pp. 208, 297). 
In the apparent expectation that sale of the Provo 
Foundry stock or liquidation of the company on a rea-
sonable basis might prove difficult due to the nature of 
the business and the possible adverse impact upon it of 
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the death of its founder and president, the testator pro-
vided in paragraph FIFTH that estate assets should not 
be sold at a sacrifice ''in order to raise funds to pay cash 
bequests made under this Will * * *.'' (R. p. 12) That the 
testator anticipated there might be a lengthy probate and 
delay in distribution of the residual estate to the trustee 
is further indicated by paragraph SIXTH which provided 
for the payment to the widow of a family allowance of 
$250.00 per month from the date of death "until such time 
as my residual estate shall be distributed to my Trustee, 
as provided in Paragraph SEVENTH hereof." (R p.l3) 
Paragraphs FIFTH and SIXTH disclose two ob-
vious intentions, first, to preserve and maintain the estate 
assets evidenced by testator's instructions that the estate 
be not too hastily liquidated even though this course 
would delay distribution and second, that the widow re-
ceive $250.00 per month from the date of death until dis-
tribution of the residual estate to the trustee. 
An interpretation that payments under subparagraph 
SEVENTH (i) commence as of the date of distribution to 
the trustee would harmonize and give effect to both in-
tentions. The interpretation made by the lower court that 
SEVENTH (i) payments commence as of the testator's 
death is not consistent with either intention, first because 
under it delay in liquidating and distributing the estate 
while avoiding loss of the estate through a hasty sale 
would result in its depletion through duplicate payments 
to the widtrw during the period of probate and second 
because such interpretation destroys the obvious design 
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that the widow receive, either from the estate or the trust, 
the sum of $250.00 per month from the date of testator's 
death until her death or remarriage. 
Reference is made to the attached Enclosure ''A'' 
which illustrates the unfair and unreasonable effect of 
the lower court's interpretation. The amounts decreed 
to be due respondents, including principal and interest, 
total $14,115.50, which represents 8.91 per cent of the 
residual estate of $158,339.22 distributed to the trustee. 
If the inability to make a reasonable sale or liquidation 
had extended probate for an additional three years or an 
additional five years, totals of $26,426.75 and $34,868.75 
would be due respondents under the lower court's inter-
pretation, representing respectively 16.69 per cent and 
22.02 per cent of the residual estate distributed to the 
trustee. These amounts of course are additional to the 
monthly $250.00 family allowance paid the widow who 
received the total of $8,750.00 as family allowance dur-
ing probate and who would have received, had probate 
been extended for an additional three or five years an 
additional $9,000.00 or $15,000.00. Assuming then that pro-
bate had been extended until September, 1962, the widow, 
under the lower court's interpretation, would be entitled 
to receive approximately $24,906.25 plus the $23,750.00 
in family allowance she would already have received or 
a total of $48,656.25, representing approximately 30 per 
cent of the estate distributed to the trustee, all this being 
additional to : 
(a) The home held in joint tenancy, 
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(b) The real property at Vivian Park, 
(c) Cash in the joint checking account, 
(d) The family automobile, 
(e) The furnishings and furniture of the two 
homes, 
(f) The right to receive $250.00 per month for life 
or until remarriage, 
(g) The right to receive additional needed amounts 
under paragraph SEVENTH (j) (2) of the will 
where illness, accident or other causes produces 
need. 
An interpretation that the testator intended to grant 
to the widow, to whom he had been married for less than 
four years, this additional large amount to the detri-
ment of his children and grandchildren is not only con-
trary to the expressed intention but is unreasonable 
and unjust This is particularly so where, as is true here, 
the interpretation contended for by appellants provides 
the widow with an adequate assured monthly income for 
life which with the other above enumerated bequests and 
benefits to the widow leaves her in a secure and comfort-
able position enjoyed by few. Furthermore, the lower 
court's interpretation is not based upon any language 
thnt the testator intended this unreasonable result but 
rather upon the erroneous legal conclusion discussed 
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below that paragraph SEVENTH (i) created- "annui-
ties" which under the statute commence at death. 
As to Mrs. Meyer the interpretation urged by ap-
pellants is not only consistent with the will provisions 
but is reasonable as it assures her a steady monthly 
income for life which has been paid since distribution of 
the residual estate on October 18, 1957, and which will 
continue to be paid. 
In arguing, as they do above, that it is unreasonable 
to construe the will as the lower court did, appellants do 
not wish to be understood as implying or suggesting that 
the testator could not have given the widow and Mrs. 
Meyer what the lower court says he did or that he could 
not have omitted making any provision for his children 
and grandchildren if he had elected to do so. Of course, 
the testator had the power to dispose of his estate as he 
wished. But having in his will manifested a concern over 
and an intention to benefit his children and grandchildren, 
appellants assert it is unreasonable to interpret the will 
as the lower court has done, the effect of which is to give 
the respondents a disproportionately large share of the 
estate contrary to the expressed intention of the testator 
and to the detriment of his children and grandchildren. 
PoiNT III. 
THE PAYMENTS UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH 
SEVENTH (i) OF THE WILL ARE NOT ANNUITIES 
AND ARE NOT CONTROLLED BY SECTION 74-3-14, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
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The 'lower court found that the bequests made by 
subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the will were "in the 
nature of annuities" controlled by Section 74-3-14, U.C.A. 
1953, and that ''as such annuities said bequests com-
menced September 14, 1954, the date of the death of said 
deceased.'' (R. p. 464) 
Based upon that finding the lower court decreed that 
respondents were entitled to payments under said sub-
paragraph SEVENTH (i) dating from the death of the 
testator. 
Appellants urge that the lower court erred in mak-
ing these findings and decree because (a) the bequests 
made by said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) are not annui-
ties and are not controlled by said Section 7 4-3-14, U.C.A. 
1953~ and (b) in any event the provisions of the testator's 
will construed together show an intention that payments 
under said subparagraph SEVENTH (i) were not to com-
mence until the distribution of the residual estate to the 
trustee. 
The Utah Code defines annuities as follows : 
(1) Sectio-n 31·-11-2, U. C. A. 1953: 
'' * * * Annuities are all agreements to make perio-
dical payments where the making or continuance 
of all or some of the series of such payments, or the 
amount of any such payment is dependent upon 
the continuance of human life, except payments 
made under the authority of the previous 
parngraph.'' 
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The payments excepted in the above quotation are 
dissimilar to the payments provided by subparagraph 
SEVENTH (i). 
(2) Section 74-3·-1, U. C.A. 1953: 
'' * * * ( 3) An annuity is a bequest of certain speci-
fied sums periodically ; if the fund or property out 
of which they are payable fails, resort may be 
had to the general assets as in case of a general 
legacy.'' 
Three essential elements of an annuity emerge from 
the above definitions: 
1. The making, continuance or amount of the pay-
ments must be dependent upon the continuance of 
human life. 
2. The payments must be specified and made 
periodically. 
3. The right to receive or the duty to make the 
periodic payments must be certain or sure. 
These correspond with the commonly accepted defi-
nition of an annuity as being ''a gift of a specific amount 
payable periodically, absolutely and generally without 
contingency" (see 96 C. J. S. p. 351; Wills § 902) 
except that in Utah it is required in addition that the 
payments be dependent upon the continuance of human 
life. 
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Applying these tests, it is obvious that subparagraph 
SEVENTH (i) and subparagraph SEVENTH (k)* to 
which (i) is expressly made subject, do not create 
annuities. 
As to the trust provision for Mrs. Pierpont, the mak-
ing or continuance of payments to her was expressly 
conditioned (a) upon her not accepting the alternative 
bequest in paragraph EIGHTH and (b) upon her not 
remarrying. Had she accepted the bequest made by said 
paragraph EIGHTH the payments would never have 
commenced and should she remarry the payments will 
cease. Having declined to accept the paragraph EIGHTH 
bequest, payments to her are not now dependent alone 
upon the continuance of human life as Section 31-11-2 
requires but upon the continuance of her unmarried 
status. Also because payments to the widow will cease 
upon her remarriage, the payments to her are not certain 
or absolute. 
* "(k) If, at any time the income of the Trust Estate is insuffi-
cient to meet the payments required to be made by my Trustee, and 
principal funds are not available for such purpose, my Trustee may 
proportionately reduce the respective payments to be made to the 
extent required by the availability of funds; and, if necessary, may 
suspend further payments until funds become available through in-
come of the Trust Estate or through orderly sale of all or part of 
the principal assets. In the event any payments specified to be made 
by my Trustee shall be so reduced or suspended, it is my desire 
that when funds become available, any so resulting deficiencies in 
monthly payments shall be made up. It is my desire and instruction 
that My Trustee shall not sell principal assets at a sacrifice in order 
to obtain funds to meet the payments specified in this Will. But it is 
my desire that when, if and as required, principal assets shall be 
converted into cash or readilv salable securities in order to enable 
the Trustee to make the paynients specified hereunder, provided that 
sale of principal assets can, in the sole judg·ment and discretion of 
the Trustee, be made at a price and in a manner consistent with sound 
business judgment." 
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In addition, the provisions of. subparagraph SEV-
ENTH (k) disclose that under some circumstances the 
right of the respondents to receive the periodic payments 
is not certain and absolute but on the contrary is 
uncertain and conditional. 
If the income of the trust is insufficient to make the 
payments and if there are no principal funds available for 
that purpose, the trustee in its discretion can reduce 
or even suspend the payments until "funds become avail-
able through income of the Trust Estate or through 
orderly sale of all or part of the principal assets.'' How-
ever, any such a sale is to be made only when the trustee 
in its "sole judgment and discretion" determines that 
it can be made ''at a price and in a manner consistent 
with sound business judgment.'' (R. p. 15) This factor is 
important because if subparagraph SEVENTH (i) 
created annuities as the lower court ruled, respondents 
would be able to force a sale of trust assets to make the 
payments if there were no income or principal funds to 
pay them with. Woodley v. Woodley, 47 C. A. 2d 358, 117 
P. 2d 722, 724 (California 1941), defines as follows the 
remedies available to an annuitant to enforce payment: 
"The rule is well stated in 2 Am. Jur. p. 833 as 
follows: 'In the event of the nonpayment of an 
annuity, the old common-law writ of annuity, now 
obsolete, was a remedy resorted to by an annuitant 
to obtain redress. At the present day, however, 
the remedy for nonpayment is, in general, by a per-
sonal action of debt or covenant on the instrument 
creating the annuity (or in jurisdictions in which 
the old forms of action are abolished, a civil action 
upon the same theory), or by bill against the 
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trustee to compel an account. An annuity which 
is a charge on land in the form of a rent charge 
is enforceable by distress or an assize, if these 
remedies are still available in the particular jur-
isdiction involved, or a court of equity may 
appoint a receiver to collect the rents from such 
real estate and apply them to the satisfaction of 
a decree in favor of the annuitant; or the person 
having the right to the a.rrears is entitled in equity 
to have them raised by sale or mortgage of the 
estate; and the court will decree accordingly, even 
though the person claiming relief is entitled to the 
legal remedies of distress and perception of 
rents." (Emphasis added) 
It is manifest that the testator did not intend to create 
annuities so as to put it within the power of respondents 
to force a sale of the trust assets. On the contrary he 
expressly negatived any idea that annuities had been 
created by conferring absolute power and discretion upon 
the trustee as to the time when trust assets would be sold. 
Furthermore, when income or liquid principal assets 
are available after payments have been reduced or sus-
pended, respondents do not have an absolute right that 
they be made up. The following provision of subpara-
graph SEVENTH (k), phrased as it is in language of 
desire or request, does not impose a duty on the trustee 
to make up reduced or suspended payments but leaves 
the matter within its sound discretion: 
''In the event any payments specified to be made 
by my Trustee shall be so reduced or susp~nded, 
it is my desire that when funds become aYmlable, 
any so resulting deficiences in monthly payments 
shall be made up.'' (Emphasis added) (R. P.15) 
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This interpretation is based upon the well-established 
rule of will construction that words of desire addressed to 
a trustee are generally regarded as precatory, not manda-
tory, unless a penalty for failure to carry out the testa-
tor's wish is imposed. The principle is well stated in the 
following quotation from 95 C. J. S., p. 803, Wills § 602 
which also distinguishes language of desire directed to 
beneficiaries, executors and trustees : 
''Distinctions have been drawn between expres-
sions of desire directed to beneficiaries, to execu-
tors, and to trustees. A wish directed to a 
beneficiary is generally regarded as precatory, 
unless the words clearly express the testator's 
intention to the contrary; but where the words are 
addressed to an executor, they are more often 
regarded as mandatory, or at least prima facie 
mandatory. Where such words are addressed to a 
tnttstee, they are generally regarded as precatory, 
unless a penalty for failure to carry out the testa-
tor's wish is imposed." (Emphasis added) 
This general rule must, of course, yield to any ex-
pressed contrary intention of the testator. However, an 
examination of the Pierpont will, which obviously was 
worded with great care and skill, representing as it does 
the carefully thought out instructions of a man trained 
through long years of business experience to understand 
and appreciate the importance of accurate and explicit 
statement, supports the interpretation that the trustee 
has the discretion to make up or not make up reduced or 
suspended payments. Note the significant change in the 
language used in the second and third sentences of sub-
paragraph SEVENTH (k). 
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In the second sentence in reference to the making up 
of deficiences, the testator said "it is my desire that when 
funds become available'' the resulting deficiencies be 
made up. In the third sentence which immediately fol-
lows, the testator states "it is my desire and instruction 
that my Trustee shall not sell principal assets at a sacri-
fice in order to obtain funds to meet the payments speci-
fied in this Will." (Emphasis added) Also in the last 
sentence of said subparagraph SEVENTH (k) in reference 
to the sale of principal assets, the testator uses only the 
precatory words ''it is my desire,'' conferring upon the 
trustee discretion with respect to the liquidation of trust 
estate assets. But in the first sentence of subparagraph 
SEVENTH (l) the testator provides that it is his "desire 
and instruction" (emphasis added) that his Provo Can-
yon home be sold to his son Thomas G. Pierpont for a 
specified sum. (R. p. 15) 
Had the testator intended that the trustee be re-
quired to make up reduced or suspended payments and 
not have discretion to make them up or not, he would have 
coupled the words "it is my desire" with the words "and 
instruction'' as he did in the sentence immediately fol-
lowing and in the first sentence of subparagraph 
SEVENTH (1). 
There are a number of reasons why the testator 
would have \Yanted to confer upon the trustee discretion 
in making up or not making up reduced or suspended pay-
ments. For example, suppose that existing economic or 
other conditions had prevented reasonable liquidation 
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of the Provo Foundry and Machine Company stock for 
some time after distribution of the residual estate to the 
trustee and that there was no income from said stock or 
the other trust assets thus requiring a suspension of pay-
ments to the respondents. Suppose also that shortly 
before liquid assets become available, both respondents 
die. If the trustee had no discretion in making up sus-
pended payments under subparagraph SEVENTH (k) 
they would be payable, respectively, to the estates of Mrs. 
Pierpont and Mrs. Meyer and would pass to their heirs 
and legatees and would thus be diverted from the use of 
the other trust beneficiaries. 
Certainly the testator did not intend that the re-
spondents' heirs would benefit in preference to his chil-
dren and grandchildren. Such a possibility was avoided 
by conferring discretion upon the trustee as to whether 
reduced or suspended payments would be made up when 
income from the trust or liquid principal assets were 
available to the trustee. 
In re Pittock's Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633, 635, 
642-643 (Oregon 1921) which involved the interpretation 
of precatory language addressed to a trustee has impor-
tant parallels with the Pierpont will. In that case the fol-
lowing provision of the will of Henry L. Pittock was in 
question: 
''None of my stock in the Oregonian Publishing 
Company shall be sold, but shall be held intact 
during the entire period of this trust, I direct that 
my trustees shall vote said stock in favor of them-
selves as directors of said corporation, and it is my 
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desire and I request that C. A. Morden shall be 
elected manager of the Oregonian and. shall be re-
tained as such, and that Edgar B. Piper shall be 
retained as managing editor of the Oregonian 
until he shall become incapacitated or until he may 
voluntarily resign.'' 
Decedent's daughter contended that this provision 
invalidated the will because it imposed an absolute duty 
upon the trustees to vote the stock of the Oregonian Pub-
lishing Company in a designated manner, thus creating 
a conflict between their duties as directors to the detri-
ment of the latter relation. After discussing numerous 
cases, the Oregon court stated : 
''Reverting to the Oregonian clause, we find that 
the will 'directs ' the trustees to vote the stock in 
favor of themselves as directors of said corpora-
tion. Immediately the tone of the language 
changes, 'and it is my desire and I request,' etc. 
If the testator, familiar as he was from his expe-
rience as a newspaper man with the use of words 
and their shades of meaning, had desired to make 
the employment of Morden and Piper imperative, 
he most likely would have grouped all those mat-
ters under the mandatory word 'direct.' In the im-
mediately preceding cla~se of the will he had de-
clared that -
'The trustees shall have full and complete 
power and authority over my estate, they 
shall have full and complete possession and 
control of same.' 
Finally in that clause, speaking directly about 
shares. of stock, he employed this language: 
'They shall ha Ye power to Yote my stock in 
the various corporations at all meetings of the 
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stockholders of such corporations and shall 
have all powers incident to the ownership of 
such stock.' 
In view of this strong and comprehensive lan-
guage, the change of his expression immediately 
from 'direct' to 'desire' and 'request' is very sig-
nificant, and we think it is legitimate to construe 
the latter clause as merely precatory and advisory, 
but not mandatory.'' 
So here, in view of the strong and comprehensive 
language and the change in expression from ''it is my 
desire'' to ''it is my desire and instruction,'' the former 
clause is merely precatory and advisory, but not 
mandatory. 
For the above stated reasons appellants assert that 
the gifts made by subparagraph SEVENTH (i) cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as annuities. 
There is a suggestion that the lower court recognized 
that said gifts were not in fact annuities. In its finding 
No. 4 (R. p. 464) and in paragraph 1 of its judgment 
and decree (R. p. 470) it is stated that the bequests made 
by subparagraph SEVENTH (i) of the testator's will 
''are in the nature of annuities'' and controlled by Section 
74-3-14, U. C. A. 1953. However, that section does not 
provide that bequests in the n.ature of annuities com-
mence at the testator's death but only that annuities 
commence at that time. For the purpose of determining 
whether or not said Section 74-3-i4 is controlling here, 
it must be determined whether or not annuities have 
been created. If they have not the section is not applic-
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able. Bequests in the nature of annuities are insufficient 
to make it applicable. 
In any event, saia Section 74-3-14 only raises a pre-
sumption that annuities commence at the testator's de-
cease, which presumption under Section 7 4-3-16 is con-
trolled by the testator's express intention. Appellants 
respectfully submit that the provisions of testator's will 
analyzed and discussed in Points I and II above show an 
express intention that the payments under subparagraph 
SEVENTH ( i) were not to commence until the trust 
estate had been created by the distribution of the resid-
ual estate to the trustee. 
But even assuming said bequests are interpreted as 
annuities which commenced at testator's death, respond-
ents would have the absolute right only to those pay-
ments that accrued betweenAugust 29, 1957, and October 
18, 1957. Until August 29, 1957, there was no income 
and no principal assets from which the payments could 
have been made even had the trustee been in control of 
the property which later comprised the trust estate. 
Therefore, any payments for the period between the date 
of death and August 29, 1957, must be considered as 
suspended payments and under subparagraph SEV-
ENTH (k) the question of whether such payments are 
to be made up is a matter that lies within the sound 
discretion of the trustee. 
It is emphasized that the fact that the trustee has 
the discretion to make up such suspended payments is not 
to be interpreted as in an3- way questioning the rights of 
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the respondents to hereafter receive the stated monthly 
payments. The assets of the trust estate now consist of 
liquid income producing assets of sufficient quantity to 
insure that the respondents' monthly payments will here-
after promptly be made and the right of the respondents 
to hereafter receive such monthly payments is questioned 
by no one. 
Attention is called to paragraph 4 of the decree (R. 
p. 471) which directs that the sums awarded respond-
ents are to be paid directly to them. In this connection 
appellants note that the last sentence of paragraph 
NINTH of the will provides : 
''Any share of the income or principal of the Trust 
Estate shall be payable and deliverable only and 
personally to the respective beneficiary entitled 
thereto or other legally appointed and acting per-
sons, representatives of such beneficiary, provided 
that my Trustee may, in its sole and absolute dis-
cretion, make any payment of income or principal 
for the benefit of the beneficiary entitled thereto 
rather than directly to such beneficiary, if the 
Trustee deems this for the best interests of the 
beneficiary. ' ' 
and gives the trustee discretion to make payments to the 
beneficiaries either directly or to third parties for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries if the trustee in its "absolute 
discretion'' so decides. 
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PoiNT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT INTER-
EST BE PAID TO RESPONDENTS ON THE AMOUNTS 
DECREED TO BE DUE THEM. 
The lower court directed that interest be paid tore-
spondents on the sums decreed to be due to them pay-
able ''from the dates that they became due at the rate 
of six per cent per annum.'' (R. p. 471) 
The award of interest obviously is erroneous if, as 
appellants assert, the testator did not intend that pay-
ments would commence until the trust was created by the 
distribution of the residual estate to the trustee. 
In any event, the award is erroneous as to any pay-
ments for the period prior to August 29, 1957, since it is 
within the discretion of the trustee as to whether any 
such payments shall be made up. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that the lower court's 
decree should be reversed because the provisions of the 
testator's will construed together show (a) that the pay-
ments provided by subparagraph SEVENTH (i) are not 
annuities and (b) that the trust was to be created at the 
time the residual estate was distributed to the trustee and 
that the subparagraph SEVENTH (i) payments were not 
to commence until then. 
In any event, the decree should be reversed as to any 
payments for the period prior to August 29,1957, because 
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the question of whether any such payments are to be 
made up lies within the sound discretion of the trustee. 
Furthermore, the decree is erroneous in ordering any 
direct payments to the respondents since the will gives 
the trustee" absolute discretion" as to whether any pay-
ments are to be made directly to the trust beneficiaries or 
to third parties for their benefit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
FRANCIS M. GIBBONS 
622 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ENCLOSURE "A" 
Payments Payments Cumulative Cumulative Payments Total of Interest Total of Percentage for Periods to Mrs. to Mrs. Monthly on Monthly Monthly of Gross Ending Pierpont Meyer Payments Payments Payments Estate Plus Interest 
10-14-54 $250.00 $100.00 $ 350.00 $ $ 350.00 % 11-14-54 250.00 100.00 700.00 1.75 701.75 
12-14-54 250.00 100.00 1,050.00 3.50 1,055.25 
1-14-55 250.00 100.00 1,400.00 5.25 1,410.50 
2-14-55 250.00 100.00 1,750.00 7.00 1,767.50 
3-14-55 250.00 100.00 2,100.00 8.75 2,126.25 
4-14-55 250.00 100.00 2,450.00 10.50 2,486.75 
5-14-55 250.00 100.00 2,800.00 12.25 2,849.00 
6-14-55 250.00 100.00 3,150.00 14.00 3,213.00 
7-14-55 250.00 100.00 3,500.00 15.75 3,578.75 
8-14-55 250.00 100.00 3,850.00 17.50 3,946.25 
9-14-55 250.00 100.00 4,200.00 19.25 4,315.50 2.72 
10-14-55 250.00 100.00 4,550.00 21.00 4,686.50 
11-14-55 250.00 100.00 4,900.00 22.75 5)059.25 
12-14-55 250.00 100.00 5,250.00 24.50 5,433.75 
1-14-56 250.00 100.00 5,600.00 26.25 5,810.00 
2-14-56 250.00 100.00 5,950.00 28.00 6,188.00 
3-14-56 250.00 100.00 6,300.00 29.75 6,567.75 
4-14-56 250.00 100.00 6,650.00 31.50 6,949.25 
5-14-56 250.00 100.00 7,000.00 33.25 7,332.50 
6-14-56 250.00 100.00 7,350.00 35.00 7,717.50 
7-14-56 250.00 100.00 7,700.00 36.75 8,104.25 
8-14-56 250.00 100.00 8,050.00 38.50 8,492.75 
9-14-56 250.00 100.00 8,400.00 40.25 8,883.00 5.61 
10-14-56 250.00 100.00 8,750.00 42.00 9,275.00 
11-14-56 250.00 100.00 9,100.00 43.75 9,668.75 
12-14-56 250.00 100.00 9,450.00 45.50 10,064.25 
1-14-57 250.00 100.00 9,800.00 47.25 10,461.50 
2-14-57 250.00 100.00 10,150.00 49.00 10,860.50 
3-14-57 250.00 100.00 10,500.00 50.75 11,261.25 
4-14-57 250.00 100.00 10,850.00 52.50 11,663.75 
5-14-57 205.00 100.00 11,200.00 54.25 12,068.00 
6-14-57 250.00 100.00 11,550.00 56.00 12,474.00 
7-14-57 250.00 100.00 11,900.00 57.75 12,881.75 
8-14-57 250.00 100.00 12,250.00 59.50 13,291.25 
9-14-57 250.00 100.00 12,600.00 61.25 13,702.50 
10-14-57 250.00 100.00 12,950.00 63.00 14,115.50 8.91 
Cumulative Total of Payments Extended Through September 14, 1960 
9-14-60 250.00 100.00 25,200.00 124.25 26,426.75 16.69 
Cumulative Total of Payments Extended Through September 14, 1962 
D-14-62 250.00 100.00 33,600.00 166.25 34,868.75 22.02 
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